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Abstract 
 
The study assesses the role of forces of law and order in modulating the insecurity-tourism 
nexus in 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. Policy syndromes or insecurity dynamics 
include: violent crime, access to weapons, political instability and perception of criminality 
while the policy variables of forces of law and order are captured with “security officers & 
police” and “armed service personnel”. The empirical evidence is based on Negative 
Binomial regressions.  The findings show that the policy variables can be effectively used to 
crowd-out the negative incidence of policy syndromes on tourist arrivals. The results are 
contingent on net effects (from conditional and unconditional effects), insecurity dynamics 
and thresholds. A threshold is an inflexion point at which the unfavorable unconditional effect 
from a policy syndrome of insecurity on tourist arrivals is completely neutralized by policy 
variables of forces of law and order. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 This study is underpinned by two fundamental perspectives in academic and policy 
circles, notably: the growing relevance of insecurity and gaps in the tourism literature. In what 
follows, these two fundamental points are substantiated in the same order of chronology.  
 First, as recently documented by Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017), over 13% of the 
global annual GDP is spent on fighting and preventing insecurity-related issues. This 
substantial portion of world GDP represents the combined annual wealth produced by a 
significant number of technically-advanced nations, namely: Brazil, Canada, France, 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The study also projects global insecurity and 
corresponding negative externalities to rise in the coming years.  This narrative and projection 
are broadly consistent with less contemporary reports from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to UNODC (2013), violence, murders, crimes and 
political instability represent growing policy syndromes that need to be prevented and 
mitigated if resources are to be diverted to more valuable policy initiatives that are reflected in 
the post-2015 sustainable development agenda1. This is essentially because on the one hand, 
public spending is substantially diverted from the provision of public commodities and on the 
other hand, insecurity-related externalities have detrimental effects on the sound development 
of many economic sectors. An example of an industry that to the best of our knowledge is 
most affected by insecurity is the tourism industry. Unfortunately, recent literature has not 
connected policy variables to the discussed policy syndrome with the aim of providing policy 
insights into how the tourism industry can be promoted. 
 Second, the tourism literature has largely focused on the determinants of tourism. The 
substantial bulk of studies constituting this strand include: Sönmez et al. (1999), Seddighi et 
al. (2001), Pizam and Fleischer (2002), Kingsbury and Brunn (2004), Sönmez and Graefe 
(1998), Saha and  Yap (2014),  Alvarez and  Campo (2014), Mehmood et al. (2016) and 
Asongu et al. (2019a). A common denominator of the studies is the absence of a framework 
that connects policy syndromes with policy variables in order to determine tourism. We 
deviate from this stream of literature by assessing how policy variables (of forces of law and 
order) can be used to mitigate the unfavorable consequences of insecurity on tourism. The 
policy variables are “security officers & police” and “armed service personnel” whereas 
                                                          
1
 Fosu (2013) has defined policy syndromes as circumstances that are perilous to economic growth, notably: 
‘administered redistribution’, ‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal resource 
allocation’. Tchamyou et al. (2019) understand policy syndrome as inequality. Within the framework of this 
paper, policy syndromes are insecurity dynamics, notably: access to weapons, violent crime, perception of 
criminality and political instability. 
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insecurity dynamics include: violent crime, access to weapons, political instability and 
perception of criminality. Hence, the research question answered by this study is the 
following: how do forces of law and order modulate the effect of insecurity on tourism across 
the world?  
 The theoretical framework underlying the paper is the Wound Culture. The Would                
Culture Theory (WCT) is consistent with this study in the perspective that it is the 
responsibility of forces of law and order to prevent insecurity-related issues by enforcing the 
rule of law and maintaining order. Accordingly, forces of law and order control insecurity 
dynamics (such as violent crime, access to weapons, political instability and perception of 
criminality) that are likely to fuel insecurity and hence, discourage tourist arrivals.   
 Consistent with Mark Seltzer (1998), as recently documented by Gibson (2006), the 
WCT can  be summarized as follows: “Serial killing has its place in a public culture in which 
addictive violence has become not merely a collective spectacle but one of the crucial sites 
where private desire and public fantasy cross. The convening of the public around scenes of 
violence–the rushing to the scene of the accident, the milling around the point of impact–has 
come to make up a wound culture; the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn 
and open persons, a collective gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound”. (Seltzer, 
1998, p. 19). 
 In the light of the WCT, the drive to entertain an atmosphere of shattered human 
bodies is prevalent in societies. Such a drive to “rip the human body asunder is both figurative 
(through criticism) and literally (through mutilation)”. In essence, the insecurity dynamics 
considered in this study are characteristics of citizens committed to wound appreciation: “One 
discovers again and again the excitations in the opening of private and bodily and psychic 
interiors; the exhibition and witnessing, the endlessly reproducible display, of wounded 
bodies and wounded minds in public. In wound culture, the very notion of sociality is bound 
to the excitations of the torn and open body, the torn and exposed individual, as public 
spectacle” (Seltzer, p. 137). “Seltzer (p. 21) further observed that the wound theory has 
substantial implications in citizenry attitude formation”: “The spectacular public 
representation of violated bodies, across a range of official, academic, and media accounts, 
in fiction and in film, has come to function as a way of imagining and situating our notions of 
public, social, and collective identity.” The articulated wound culture intuitively fuels 
insecurity and it is the duty of forces of law and order to reduce the negative externalities of 
insecurity dynamics on macroeconomic outcomes like tourism. Moreover, it is important to 
articulate that the adopted WCT aligns with the positioning of this study from two angles. (i) 
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As will be expanded in section 2 from the surveyed literature, the insecurity dynamics used in 
this research have been documented to influence tourist arrivals. This is principally because 
the insecurity dynamics are associated with conditions that negatively affect the human body 
and wound atmosphere as emphasized in the WCT. (ii)  The forces of law and order can by 
intuition be used to reduce externalities of wound culture in order to promote development 
outcomes, including tourism (Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018; Asongu et al., 2019a).   
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of extant 
literature.  Section 3 covers the data and methodology while the empirical analysis and 
discussion of results are disclosed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with implications and 
future research directions.   
  
2. Review of existing literature on perceived risks and tourists’ arrivals  
 Existing research motivating this study which has been highlighted in the introduction 
can be discussed in four main categories pertaining to the nexuses between tourists’ arrivals 
and perceived risks (Asongu et al., 2019a). These include: a first category of a scholarly 
consensus on the linkage between perceived risks and terror activities; a second category of 
research focusing on the relationship between tourists arrivals and terrorism; a third category 
articulating long and short term dynamic impacts related to the nexus between insecurity and 
tourists arrivals and a fourth category pertaining to the incidence of civil wars and military 
interventions on the nexuses being investigated. The strands are expanded in turn.   
 In the first category of studies in the literature, the ramifications of terrorism are 
associated with risk perceptions that intuitively deter the arrival of tourists to host 
destinations. In essence, scholarly emphasis on drivers of tourism is sympathetic to the 
perspective that standards of safety in a destination of tourism are essential in determining the 
decisions of travelers on destinations that are safe relative to those that are unsafe (Kingsbury 
& Brunn, 2004; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Sönmez et al., 1999). Accordingly, the selection of 
a travelling destination by a tourist is largely determined by safety concerns which are 
contingent on security risks and ability of forces of law and order to mitigate such underlying 
security risks (Seabra et al., 2013; Tarlow, 2006; Pizam &  Mansfeld, 2006; Ryan, 1993).  It 
goes without saying that the unfavourable ramifications of the underpinning concerns of 
security influence tourists’ perception of risk in host countries (Lepp et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, such perceptions of risks are not exclusively country-focused because in 
situations where a particular tourist destination is not directly characterized by political strife 
and significant risks of insecurity, risks factors may constraint tourists to avoid the tourist 
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destination because of potential transnational insecurity incidences (Lepp & Gibson, 2003; 
Yaya, 2009). This view of cross-country influence is consistent with many thematic 
scholarships, inter alia:  how externalities of the Gulf war influenced tourists’ decisions to 
travel of Kenya and Tanzania (Honey, 1999) and recently, the incidence of the Syrian war on 
Jordanian tourism corporations (Liu et al., 2016). In summary, global characteristics of peace 
and insecurity influence travelers’ decision on potential countries of destination (Mansfeld & 
Pizam, 2006).   
 According to Drakos  and Kutan (2003) and Kapuściński and Richards (2016), the 
factor of perceived risks in potential travelers fundamentally builds on the fact that violence, 
crime and political strife instill fear in people desiring to visit affected areas (Drakos & Kutan, 
2003; Kapuściński & Richards, 2016). This narrative is consistent with Hoffman (2006) on 
the negative psychological ramifications of terror, Shin (2005) on the creation of 
psychological chaos associated with violent activities and a significant body of literature on 
the negative association between violence and perceived risks from tourists (Pizam, 1999; 
Taylor, 2006; Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Neumayer & Plumper, 2016; Goldman & Neubauer-
Shani, 2017). In summary, the underlying association which has been established in panel-
oriented studies (Asongu et al., 2019a) is also apparent in country-specific scholarship, 
notably: Enders and Sandler (1991) for the case of Spain, evidence from China by Gartner 
and Shen (1992), Buckley and  Klemm (1993) for Northern Ireland, Lepp and Gibson (2003) 
for the United States, Darkos and Kutan (2003) for cases of Greece, Israel and Turkey,  
Bhattarai et al. (2005) for evidence from Nepal, Raza and Jawaid (2013) for the case of 
Pakistan and Causevic  and Lynch (2013) on perspectives from Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 In the second category of the literature, scholarship has been oriented towards research 
that has resulted in either positive or insignificant linkages between violence and tourist 
arrivals. It has been established by Pizam and Mansfeld (2006) that continuous articulation of 
hot spots of violence and crime in risky tourist destinations reduces long run perceptions of 
risks in the corresponding tourists destinations. Saha and Yap (2014) document that countries 
which are associated with moderately low levels of terror activities and political risks are 
unexpectedly also linked with moderately significant arrival of tourists.  
 The third category on short and long run dynamics entails emphasis that while the 
impact of violence and terror vary from one destination to another, it is also contingent on a 
time factor. According to Coshall (2003) and Liu and Pratt (2017), terror incidents engender 
short term unfavorable effects on tourists arrivals while Sönmez and Graefe (1998) and Saha 
and Yap (2014) are of the position that such consequences of conflicts persists over time. This 
7 
 
is consistent with Sönmez (1998) who had earlier concluded that political strife substantially 
affects long run decisions on the choice of travel destinations. Some illustrative examples are 
apparent from Alvarez and Campo (2014) and  Mehmood et al. (2016) who have concluded 
that the longstanding crisis between Israel and Palestine affects the decision of tourists to 
travel the countries in conflicts. In another example, Rittichainuwat and Rattanaphinanchai 
(2015) also show that the entrenched strife between South Korea and North Korea has 
significantly affected the long run destination image of both countries and by extension, 
tourists’ arrivals in these countries.   
 In the fourth category pertaining to military expenditure and military coups, Fletcher 
and Morakabati (2008) have established that the latter has an unfavorable incidence on the 
prosperity of the tourism industries in Kenya and Fiji while according to Mansfeld and Pizam 
(2006), a significant nexus is apparent between the tourism industries and wars. Sharpley 
(2003) and Farmaki et al. (2015) establish that the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey 
considerably deterred the arrival of tourists whereas Mehmood et al. (2016) in more 
contemporary development scholarship have documented that the war in Syria has wiped-out 
the country’s industry of tourism.  
 In the light of the engaged studies, the problem statement motivating this research has 
not been covered in the literature. Moreover, the engaged literature also informs this research 
on the choice of security variables that affect tourism, the importance of security forces of law 
and order that mitigate perceived risks as well as elements to be adopted in the conditioning 
information set that determine tourists’ arrivals. As justified in the introduction and further 
articulated in the data and methodology sections that follow, the choice of the underlying 
variables are also consistent with the WCT underpinning the empirical analysis.  
  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study is focused on a sample of 163 countries in the world with data from 2010 to 2015. 
The data come from diverse sources, notably: “the United Nations (UN) Committee on 
Contributions, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems (CTS), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on 
Crime Trends, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset and Qualitative assessments by Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates”. The temporal and geographic scopes of the study 
8 
 
are contingent on data availability constraints. This justification is consistent with Asongu et 
al. (2019a, 2019b). 
 The outcome indicator is the number of tourist arrivals while the policy variables of 
forces of law and order include: “security officers & police” and “armed service personnel”. 
The insecurity variables are captured with four main dynamics, namely: “access to weapons”, 
“violent crime”, “perception of criminality” and political instability. The choice of these 
policy variables and policy syndromes is consistent with recent literature on conflicts; crimes 
and violence (see Blanco & Grier, 2009; Freytag et al., 2011; 2017; GPI, 2016). 
   
Table 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions of variables and sources  
  
Tourism  “The number of tourists arrivals”  
  
Security Officers & Police “Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates” 
  
Armed Services Personnel “Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 
The Military Balance, IISS” 
  
Access to Weapons  “Ease of access to small arms and light weapons 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts” 
  
Violent crime  “Level of violent crime” 
“Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Perceptions of Criminality  Level of perceived criminality in society 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts” 
  
Political instability  “Political instability” 
“Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts” 
  
Homicides  “Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates” 
  
Incarceration  “Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex” 
  
Violent demonstrations  “Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts” 
  
  “Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)”. 
 
Other adopted variables in the conditioning information set include: homicides, 
incarcerations and violent demonstrations. These indicators are in accordance with recent 
literature on tourists arrivals (Sönmez &  Graefe, 1998; Sönmez et al., 1999; Seddighi et al., 
2001; Pizam & Fleischer, 2002; Kingsbury & Brunn, 2004; Saha &  Yap, 2014; Alvarez &  
Campo, 2014; Mehmood et al., 2016).  We expect homicides and violent demonstrations to 
reduce the number of tourist arrivals while incarcerations should be positively associated with 
it. The two policy variables are used interchangeably as control variables in order to verify an 
intuition underpinning the study, notably: the positive role of policy variables on tourist 
arrivals. Hence, in regressions in which “security officers & police” is the policy variable, 
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“armed service personnel” is used as a control variable while in regressions in which “armed 
service personnel” is the policy variable, “security officers & police” is included in the 
conditioning information set. We expect these policy variables to positively affect the number 
of tourist arrivals when they are adopted as control variables.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Tourist arrivals  6.7533e+6 1.2644e+7 8000.0 8.3767e+7 732 
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Armed Services Personnel 1.648 0.725 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Access to Weapons  3.116 1.080 1.000 5.000 978 
Violent crime  2.768 1.136 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Criminality  3.153 0.917 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Violent demonstrations  2.912 0.969 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (163) 
 “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size = 971) 
           
Weapons Crime Criminality Pol. Inst Homicide Incarce Demon ASP SOP Tourists  
1.000 0.649 0.613 0.573 0.563 -0.104 0.526 -0.119 -0.035 -0.278 Weapons 
 1.000 0.669 0.433 0.611 -0.059 0.566 -0.269 -0.117 -0.227 Crime 
  1.000 0.448 0.512 -0.056 0.469 -0.156 -0.024 -0.105 Criminality  
   1.000 0.242 -0.138 0.658 0.092 -0.0007 -0.332 Pol. Inst. 
    1.000 0.182 0.274 -0.254 -0.024 -0.275 Homicide 
     1.000 -0.148 0.179 0.274 0.162 Incarce 
      1.000 -0.043 -0.083 -0.189 Demon 
       1.000 0.228 0.034 ASP 
        1.000 0.030 SOP 
         1.000 Tourists 
           
“Weapons: Access to weapons. Crime: Violent crime. Criminality: Perceptions of criminality. Pol. Inst: Political instability. ASP: Armed 
Service Personnel. Incarce: Incarcerations. Demon: Violent demonstrations. SOP : Security Officers & Police.   5% critical value (two-tailed) 
= 0.0629 for n = 971”. 
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The definitions and sources of variables are disclosed in Table 1, the sampled 
countries and summary statistics are provided in Table 2 while the corresponding correlation 
matrix is in Table 3. Given that the standard deviation of the outcome variable is higher than 
the corresponding mean, a Negative Binomial model is more appropriate because of evidence 
of over-dispersion. 
 
3.2 Negative Binomial regression 
In accordance with recent literature on positively skewed data (Choi & Luo, 2013; Choi, 
2015; Asongu et al., 2019a, 2019b), the research employs a Negative Binomial regression. In 
the regression, “the mean of y is determined by the exposure time t  and a set of k  regressor 
variables (the x’s). The expression relating these quantities is presented in Equation (1)”:  ��
 
= �xp (ln(��) + �1�1� + �2�2� + ⋯ + �k�k�),                                                                   (1) 
where, �1 ≡ 1 and β1 is the intercept. β1, β2, …, βk “correspond to unknown parameters to be 
estimated. Their estimates are symbolized as b1, b2, …, bk. The fundamental negative 
binomial regression model for an observation i  is written as in Equation (2)”:  
 
  iy
i
i
ii
i
ii y
yyY 

















11
1
)1()(),Pr(
1
1
1
 ,                               
(2) 
“where,  ii t
 
and 
1
 
in the generalised Poisson distribution which  includes a gamma 
noise variable with a mean of 1 and a scale of    . The parameter μ represents the mean 
incidence rate of y per unit of exposure or time. Hence, μ is the risk of a new occurrence of 
the event during a specified exposure period, t (NCSS, 2017)”. Consistent with recent 
literature (see Mlachila et al., 2017), the independent variables are lagged by one year in order 
to increase control for endogeneity.   
 Equation (3) summarizes the corresponding statistical model used in the analysis 
tiitih
h
htitititi WPSPVPVPST ,,,
4
1
,3,2,10,    

    ,                      (3) 
where tiT ,
 
is the number of tourists arrivals for country i
 
in period t ;  is a constant;
 
PS , is 
a policy syndrome (violent crime, access to weapons, political instability and perception of 
criminality); PV , is a policy variable (“security officers & police” or  armed service 
personnel) ; PSPV , the interaction between a policy syndrome and a policy variable;
 
W  is 
the vector of control variables  (homicides, incarcerations, violent demonstrations and a 
policy variable);
 
and ti ,  the error term.  
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 Since the research is employing an interactive estimation approach, it is important to 
articulate some fundamentals in the adopted approach. Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006), 
all constitutive variables are involved in the specifications. Furthermore, the estimated 
interactions are interpreted as conditional effects and should be combined with the 
corresponding unconditional effects in order to establish a net effect from the interaction 
between two variables. Thresholds at which the modifying policy variable influence the 
policy syndrome to affect the number of tourist arrivals should be within the interval (i.e. 
minimum to maximum) provided by the summary statistics. This narrative is consistent with 
recent empirical literature (Tchamyou, 2019a).   
 A fundamental point that is worthwhile articulating is that the adopted variables of 
security in the conditioning information set as well as the independent variables of interest are 
in accordance with the wound culture theoretical underpinning motivating this research.  
Accordingly, while the adopted indicators are justified with the relevant tourism-centric 
literature in the previous section, the nexus between the choice of variables and the underlying 
Wound Culture Theory is clarified in the introduction and literature review sections.  It 
follows that the application of the underpinning theory within the context of tourism and 
associated independent variable of interest (i.e. security indicators, insecurity dynamics and 
control variables) are characterised by some elements of consistency.  Moreover, the research 
anticipates adopted elements in the conditioning information set to reflect the intuition 
underlying the nexuses between the underlying theory and tourism demand. Six variables are 
employed in each specification and the research acknowledges that not all determinants of 
tourism in the real world can be modelled because of a plethora of issues, inter alia: data 
availability constraints and multicollinearity. This research is naturally confronted with these 
concerns.   
 
4. Empirical results 
 This section presents and discusses the empirical results. While Table 4 presents 
results related to “security officers & police”, the findings disclosed in Table 5 pertain to 
armed service personnel. For both tables, the first panel encompasses regressions that do not 
include the conditioning information set whereas the second panel involves control variables. 
In order to investigate the relevance of forces of law and order in mitigating the effect of 
insecurity dynamics on tourism, net effects and thresholds are computed. This approach to 
computing net effects is consistent with contemporary literature on interactive regressions 
(Tchamyou, 2019a; Agoba et al., 2019). 
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 The computation of net effects is consistent with the narrative in the last paragraph of 
the previous section. Moreover, when the overall net effect is negative and the corresponding 
conditional effect (from the interaction between the policy variable and the policy syndrome) 
is positive, it translates the need for a positive threshold to be established for the policy 
variable to make economic sense when the outcome variable is a positive macroeconomic 
signal2. The narrative is consistent with a recent stream of literature with provocative titles 
like “no positive threshold, no policy” (Asongu et al., 2018). The threshold reflects an 
inflection point or critical mass at which the unconditional negative effect of the policy 
syndrome on the outcome variable is completely neutralised. Hence, above this threshold, the 
positive effect of the policy variable outweighs the negative effect of the policy syndrome on 
the outcome variable. For the computed threshold to make economic sense, it should be 
within policy range. In other words, it should be within the minimum and maximum limits of 
the policy variable disclosed in the summary statistics.  
 The above conception and measurement of threshold for economic policy is consistent 
with the attendant literature, notably: (i) critical masses that are essential for desired effects 
(Cummins, 2000); (ii) thresholds for favourable impacts (Roller & Waverman, 2001;  Batuo, 
2015) and conditions for inverted U-shaped and U-shaped patterns (see Ashraf & Galor, 
2013). 
 In the light of the above clarification, in the second column of Table 4 below, the net 
effect from the role of “security officers & police” in modulating access to weapons is -0.660 
([0.235× 2.728] + [-1.302]), where: -1.302 is the unconditional effect from access to weapons; 
2.728 represents the average observation of security officers and police and 0.235 is the 
conditional impact from the interaction between access to weapons and “security officers & 
police”. In other words, access to weapons unconditionally reduces tourist arrivals, “security 
officers & police” dampen the negative effect of access to weapons on tourist arrivals and 
unfortunately, the net effect of modulation is negative on tourist arrivals.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Tourism is a positive macroeconomic signal while terrorism is a negative economic signal. Hence, in the 
interaction between policy syndromes and policy variables, the policy objective is to mitigate negative 
macroeconomic signals and promote positive macroeconomic signals.  
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Table 4: Negative binomial regressions with Security Officers & Police 
         
 Dependent variable: Tourist arrivals  
  
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  19.018*** 18.526*** 20.376*** 18.180*** 17.717*** 18.068*** 17.496**** 17.466*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & Police(SOP)(-1) -0.539* -0.736*** -1.455*** -0.352 -0.336 -0.631*** -0.671** -0.496** 
 (0.063) (0.001) (0.000) (0.119) (0.200) (0.000) (0.019) (0.020) 
Access to Weapons(-1) -1.302*** --- --- --- -0.728*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
Violent Crime(-1) --- -1.208*** --- --- --- -0.445** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.014)   
Perceptions of Criminality(-1)  --- --- -1.647***  --- --- -0.285 --- 
   (0.000)    (0.256)  
Political Instability(-1) --- --- --- -1.336*** --- --- --- -1.354*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Access to Weapons×SOP(-1) 0.235*** --- --- --- 0.140* --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.073)    
Violent Crime(-1)×SOP(-1) --- 0.327*** --- --- --- 0.263*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.000)   
Perceptions of Criminality×SOP(-1)  --- --- 0.518*** --- --- --- 0.234** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.010)  
Political Instability×SOP(-1) --- --- --- 0.230*** --- --- --- 0.233*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Homicides(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.405*** -0.725*** -0.678*** -0.496*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.656*** 0.693*** 0.712*** 0.680*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.182*** -0.381*** -0.351*** 0.158** 
     (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) 
Armed Services Personnel(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.097 -0.052 -0.012 0.215** 
     (0.366) (0.638) (0.910) (0.049 
         
Net effects  -0.660 -0.315 -0.233 -0.708 -0.346 0.272 0.353 -0.718 
Thresholds  5.540 3.694 3.179 5.808 5.200 1.692 1.217 5.811 
         
Log likelihood  -9527.758 -9557.153 -9573.503 -9508.718 -9467.915 -9467.974 -9469.987 -9422.896 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  138.18*** 79.39*** 46.69*** 176.26*** 257.87*** 257.75*** 253.72*** 347.91*** 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) for Alpha 1.677*** 1.800*** 1.872*** 1.601*** 1.447*** 1.447*** 1.454*** 1.291*** 
Observations  580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 
         
“***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Security Officers & Police: 2.728. Min and Maximum values 
of Security Officers & Police are respectively 1.081 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects of 
insecurity variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables”.  
 
  
A positive conditional impact  is an indication that there is a  threshold or critical mass 
at which “security officers & police” completely nullify  the unfavourable impact  of access to 
weapons on tourist arrivals is 5.540 (-1.302/0.235). We revisit the summary statistics to assess 
whether the threshold makes economic sense and by extension have policy relevance. 
Unfortunately, this is the not the case because the maximum value of “security officers & 
police” is 5.0003. Hence, the computed threshold exceeds the maximum value within policy 
reach. While this narrative on net negative effects (and corresponding thresholds beyond 
policy range) is consistent with the policy syndrome of political instability (both in 
estimations with and without the conditioning information set), this is not the case with policy 
syndromes of violent crime and perception of criminality because corresponding thresholds 
                                                          
3
 Note should be taken of the fact that within the context of the study, whereas “security officers & police” are 
measured per 100, 000 people, the values are coded on a scale 1 to 5 in the light of the level of security. 
14 
 
are within the minimum to maximum values (i.e. 1.081 to 5.000) of “security officers & 
police” disclosed in the summary statistics. While this narrative on the policy relevance of the 
thresholds is consistent with regressions with and without the conditioning information set, 
net effects in regressions with the conditioning information set are positive on tourist arrivals.   
It follows that whereas “security officers & police” can be appropriately used to 
completely mitigate the negative effect of violent crime and perception of criminality on 
tourism, its relevance on other policy syndromes (i.e. access to weapons and political 
instability) is contingent on complementary policy initiatives involving other policy variables. 
The significant control variables display the anticipated signs. As expected, homicide 
and violent demonstrations reduce the number of tourist arrivals while incarcerations and 
“armed service personnel” are positively associated with it.  
 
Table 5: Negative binomial regressions with Armed Service Personnel 
         
 Dependent variable: Tourist arrivals 
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  18.857*** 17.962*** 16.950*** 17.720*** 17.029*** 17.036*** 15.046*** 17.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Armed S. Personnel (ASP)(-1) -0.817** -0.848*** -0.242 -0.218 -0.364 -0.503** 0.306 -0.588* 
 (0.031) (0.001) (0.603) (0.563) (0.227) (0.033) (0.321) (0.051) 
Access to Weapons(-1) -1.237*** --- --- --- -0.538*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.002)    
Violent Crime(-1) --- -1.001*** --- --- --- -0.073 --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.661)   
Perceptions of Criminality(-1)  --- --- -0.482* --- --- --- 0.506*** --- 
   (0.068)    (0.006)  
Political Instability(-1) --- --- --- -1.289*** --- --- --- -1.206*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Access to Weapons× ASP (-1) 0.363*** --- --- --- 0.094 --- --- --- 
 (0.004)    (0.321)    
Violent Crime(-1)× ASP (-1) --- 0.419*** --- --- --- 0.204** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.036)   
Perceptions of Criminality× ASP (-1)  --- --- 0.131 --- --- --- -0.106 --- 
   (0.414)    (0.283)  
Political Instability× ASP (-1) --- --- --- 0.317** --- --- --- 0.282*** 
    (0.025)    (0.009) 
Homicides(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.384*** -0.703*** -0.692*** -0.505*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.663*** 0.730*** 0.753*** 0.682*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.198*** -0.430*** -0.372*** 0.155** 
     (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
Security Officers & Police (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.110 0.038 0.059 0.188*** 
     (0.152) (0.632) (0.460) (0.009) 
         
Net Effect -0.638 -0.310 na -0.766 na 0.263 na -0.741 
Threshold 3.407 2.389 na 4.066 na 0.357 na 4.276 
         
Log likelihood  -9531.982 -9561.645 -9588.299 -9512.081 -9469.042 -9473.649 -9472.706 -9425.100 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  129.73*** 70.41*** 17.10*** 169.54*** 255.61*** 246.40*** 248.29*** 343.50*** 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) for Alpha 1.694*** 1.819*** 1.938*** 1.614*** 1.451*** 1.468*** 1.464*** 1.299*** 
Observations  580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 
         
“***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Armed S. Personnel: Armed Service Personnel. Mean value of Armed 
Service Personnel: 1.648. Min and Maximum values of Armed Service Personnel are respectively 1.000 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to 
the insignificance of  unconditional effects of insecurity variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy 
variable and insecurity variables”.  
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Table 5 is a robustness check with armed service personnel as a policy variable. The 
findings are broadly consistent with those established in Table 4 pertaining to “security 
officers & police” as a policy variable, with two main exceptions: (i) the estimated values of 
interest are not significant in regressions related to the policy syndrome of perception on 
criminality and (ii) all computed thresholds are within policy range. The significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
In order to assess whether potential issues of variables omission bias in the adoption of 
elements in the conditioning information set can influence the robustness of the findings, this 
research has further employed fixed effects and random effects estimation techniques to 
examine the problem statement motivating the study. For instance, the motivation for the 
fixed effects regressions technique is that omitted variables which are time-invariant can be 
cancelled in the modelling exercise. Unfortunately, after performing this further analysis, the 
resulting information criteria used to validate the models is unfavourable to robust 
estimations. This is a confirmation of the fact that such techniques are not adapted for count 
and/or positively skewed data.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
The study has assessed the role of forces of law and order in modulating the effect of 
insecurity on tourism in 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. Policy syndromes or 
insecurity dynamics include violent crime, access to weapons, political instability and 
perception of criminality while the policy variables of forces of law and order are captured 
with “security officers & police” and “armed service personnel”. The empirical evidence is 
based Negative Binomial regressions.  The findings show that the policy variables can be 
effectively used to nullify the unfavorable impact of policy syndromes on tourist arrivals. The 
results are contingent on net effects (from conditional and unconditional effects), insecurity 
dynamics and thresholds. A threshold is an inflexion point at which the unfavorable 
unconditional effect from a policy syndrome of insecurity on tourist arrivals is completely 
neutralized by policy variables of forces of law and order.  
 More specifically, we have established that “security officers & police” can be 
appropriately used to completely dampen the unfavourable impact of violent crime and 
perception of criminality on tourism while its relevance on other policy syndromes (i.e. access 
to weapons and political instability) is contingent on complementary policy initiatives 
involving other policy variables. This implies that while “security officers & police” is a 
necessary, other factors need to be taken on board in order to completely dampen the 
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insecurity-oriented discouragements of tourist arrivals. The established findings pertaining to 
“security officers & police” are broadly consistent with those from “armed service personnel”. 
 The findings are relevant to the objectives of our study from two principal angles. On 
the one hand, we have provided insights into how forces of law and order can be used to 
assuage the negative effects of insecurity on tourism. On the other hand, we have assessed the 
existing capacity of responses by forces of law and order to insecurity-related concerns in the 
tourism industry. Whereas the former perspective has been clarified with net effects, the latter 
has been clarified with corresponding thresholds.  In what follows, we discuss some policy 
recommendations that are worthwhile in the light of established findings.  
 The forces of law and order should avoid repressive policies when fighting insecurity 
scourges. Moreover, for some insecurity dynamics (e.g. “access to weapons” and “political 
instability”), some forces of law and order (e.g.  “security officers & police”) need to be 
complemented with other policies designed to mitigate insecurity. Emphasis on the essence of 
less repressive policies build on the fact that repressions may be eventually counter-
productive, unless associated with other policy measures that curb insecurity, among others: 
the delivery of public commodities, mitigation of socio-economic inequalities and 
improvement in youth education, especially sensitization on the perils of insecurity in 
macroeconomic outcomes. First, insecurity should be considered as a public health issue and 
sensitization on this front should be encouraged with new tools of information and 
communication technologies, especially through parenting and family interventions, 
childhood education and campaigns of wellbeing. In a nutshell, these measures should focus 
on all stakeholders in society. Second, preventive programs should focus on hotspots of 
insecurity with emphasis on gone control, drugs and socio-economic inequality. Third, the 
diplomatic approaches to curbing insecurity should be complemented with new technology 
tools and mass media in order to constantly keep the international community and tourists 
(potential and actual) informed on improved security measures being implemented. In 
summary, the fact that some thresholds are not within policy range is an indication that the 
use of forces of law and order is an important but not an exhaustive measure for the mitigation 
of insecurity-oriented issues that discourage tourists’ arrivals.                                                 
 While the established findings are broadly applicable to sampled countries, future 
research can improve their relevance for policy by focusing on country-specific cases. Such 
an approach is imperative for country-specific or more targeted implications.   
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